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I. Introduction
In the past few years the public has been deluged with a constant
barrage of unfavourable articles, newsreels, television shows,
movies, books, and commentaries about lawyers. This constantly
increasing quantity is infinitesimal in size when compared to the
vast array of material written by legal educators in the last thirty
years.
If it can be accepted that the popular press represents to some
extent the voice of the people, it may be suggested that society is
trying to say something about its lawyers and the role they play in
society. The message is clear and unequivocal: lawyers are not nice
people! Regardless of how the message is interpreted by the reader,
the general tenor of the material is odious indeed.
The growing awareness that something is wrong with lawyers as
they function in society has brought about a renewed interest in
legal ethics and professional responsibility. These concerns have
prompted much discussion by legal educators in an attempt to
remedy the increasingly complex and difficult dilemma in which
lawyers find themselves.
This article will have as its focus a discussion centering upon the
role law schools in North America play in preparing lawyers for
their task. To that end, a general discussion concerning legal
education will be undertaken. This will be followed by an analysis
of the various methods used by legal educators in attempting to
grapple with the problem of professional responsibility. It will be
shown that those methods which have been used to impart the
attributes of professional responsibility have been, for the most part,
unsuccessful. Additionally, an effort will be made to show that legal
education, at least in its present form, seriously impedes the
production of professionally responsible lawyers. At this point, the
reader is warned that the paper does contain a bias in favor of
clinical education - a bias that is felt to be justified upon the review
of relevant material on both legal education and professional
*Member of the Newfoundland Bar. The author would like to thank Professor Leon
Trakman for his invaluable assistance in reading earlier drafts of this article.
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responsibility. The paper will therefore conclude in strong support
of clinical education as a more appropriate vehicle for the
transmission of those skills which are necessary for well-rounded
lawyering and for the imparting of techniques related to professional
responsibility.
II. Legal Education: Its Perspectives and Aims
Much of traditional legal education has been characterized by
objectivity and neutrality.' These features were seen as being a
necessary adjunct for the inculcation of lawyering skills. Objectivity
and value-free neutrality also became the veritable hallmark of a
good law school. 2 Legal education, it was said, had concerns which
extended beyond the "pragmatic interests of the practising
profession". 3 As well, the law schools were said to inherit a
"knowledge finding function and a critical function". 4 It was from
these institutions that the best qualified practitioners were alleged to
have emerged. 5
The lawyer's role in society demanded that the lawyer function
within the framework of what has been handily described as a
"limited purpose friendship". 6 That is, the lawyer became a friend
of the client for the duration of the lawyer-client relationship. In this
context, the lawyer need do nothing more than serve his client to the
utmost of his ability. 7 Broad questions relating to the social utility
of that relationship were not seen as being the concern of the
individual lawyer. In other words, practitioners need only be
concerned with befriending their clients; they need not be concerned
1. Allen Stone, "Legal Education on the Couch", (1971-72) 85 Harvard Law
Rev. 392 at 393-394.
2. Jerold S. Auerbach, "What Has Law Teaching To Do With Justice?" 53
N.Y.U. Law Rev., 457 at 459 (1978).
3. Francis A. Allen, Law, Intellect and Education, (University of Michigan Press,
1979) see "New Anti-Intellectualism In American Legal Education", pp. 64-65.
4. Ibid., p. 65.
5. Ibid., p. 66.
6. Charles Fried, "The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundation of the
Lawyer-Client Relation", (1975-76) 85 Yale L. Journal 1061 at 1071. For a
supporting view, see David Melkenkoff, The Conscience of a Lawyer, (St. Paul,
Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1973). Melkenkoff believes that much of the criticism
waged against the legal profession is rooted in a fundamental misconception of the
lawyers' mission. Melkenkoff maintains that the lawyer does not exist "to spread
truth and goodness to the ends of the earth". Rather, the lawyer exists to make
some sense of equality before the law.
7. Ibid., p. 1074.
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with the effect these relationships, either individually or in their
totality, may have on the society around them. 8 Morality for the
lawyer, therefore, inhered in the quality of the lawyer-client
relationship and did not extend to moral and ethical questions
arising outside that relationship. 9 The main thrust of the lawyers'
moral responsibility was, in the first instance, heavily cir-
cumscribed by prevailing beliefs and norms in legal education. This
stilted definition of morality reflected itself in older codes of
professional responsibility which laid out the criteria thought
necessary to the lawyers' moral character. 10 Following Code
requirements" lawyers were considered most virtuous, for
example, when they displayed traits of honesty, integrity, fairness,
and responsibility in their dealings with their clients. Legal morality
consisted of a group of culturally approved positive legal-moral
standards. Hence, what Lawrence Kohlberg 12 has called the "Boys
Scout" or the "Bag of Virtues" approach to moral instruction has
thus far dominated North American legal education. 13
In spite of increasing difficulties with lawyers, the traditional
approach to morality has received renewed support and has been
staunchly defended in the recent past.' 4 Indeed, it has even been
suggested that for a lawyer to act in a fashion other than that which
is dictated by the confines of the lawyer-client relationship may very
well result in an unjust or immoral act.15 Although newer
professional responsibility codes attempted to broaden the lawyers'
responsibilities to include social responsibilities,' 6 these issues were
8. Ibid., p. 1077.
9. Ibid., pp. 1083-84.
10. See, for example, Canons of Legal Ethics (adopted by the Canadian Bar
Association on September 2, 1920).
11. Ibid., pp. 4-6.
12. Lawrence Kohlberg, The Philosophy of Moral Development: Moral Stages
and The Idea of Justice, (San Francisco: Harper & Row Publishers, 1981).
13. Ibid., p. 31.
14. See generally Charles Fried, "The Lawyer As Friend: The Moral Foundations
of the Lawyer-Client Relation" and see also: Lawrence K. Hellman, "Considering
The Future of Legal Education: Law School and Social Justice, (1978) 29 J. of L.
Ed. 170; Robert L. Bard, "Teaching Justice", (1978) 53 N.Y.U. Law Rev. 616.
15. Charles Fried, p. 1066.
16. See Code of Professional Conduct; The Canadian Bar Association (1974),
Chapter XII, "The lawyer should encourage public respect for and try to improve
the administration of justice". The notion that a lawyer should be concerned with
the administration of justice first and his client second has received renewed
support. See, for example, Arthur Maloney, Q.C., "The Role of the Lawyer In
Society", (1978-79). 9 Man. L. J. 351, 357. Maloney suggests that if lawyers are
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never taken seriously nor did they receive a fair hearing in the law
schools. Thus, the schools viewed their task in terms of teaching
students how to perform as lawyers in a very limited professional
role.
Although these views are those espoused by many in North
American legal education, newer themes relating to the quality of
professionalism have emerged in recent years.' 7 The advent of the
sixties brought about a rekindling of social interest concerns in legal
education. Some academics expressed a desire to broaden the
format of legal education to include enhanced professional
competency, 1 8 notions of fairness, justice and social utility.19 As
complaints were being heard to the effect that traditional legal
to take a "wide view" of their obligations and responsibilities as professionals then
the lawyer must be prepared to go far beyond law books, the court room and the
mere defense of clients.
17. See Edward J. Bloustein, "Scoial Responsibility, Public Policy and the Law
Schools", (1980) 55 N.Y.U. Law Rev. 385 at 421. In this article, the reader is
advised that justice, morality and public policy have a rightful place in the law
schools. And for a more detailed view of the role of a good lawyer see D. L.
Johnston; "The Role of The Lawyer in Society", (1979) 13 L.S.U.C. Gazette 119
at 123. In the words of the author, the role of a good lawyer demands that he:
1) Cherish the concept of justice; 2) Treasure his reputation for integrity, and
shapes it year by year through honesty and integrity; 3) The role of the lawyer
involves a sense of responsibility to the community; 4) It is not enough that a
particular activity pays and is not against the law. There is the lawyers' canons
of ethics and there is the fact that he is an officer of the court and that he has a
role in the community, often of selfless service; 5) The lawyer as a professional
must continue to grow, continue to self-educate; 6) The lawyer has a special
responsibility for making the legal system work and work justly; 7) It (the
lawyers' role) means service to improvement of laws through contributions of
time and expertise to Bar associations, sub-committees, and Legislative Task
Forces, through work on Rules Committees, through law reform... It means
constant pressure to simplify the law and make it more understandable; 8)
Finally, the lawyers' professional role implies an insistence that the system
work for the good of all.
18. Robert A. Fairbanks, "The Failure of American Legal Education", (1976-77)
12 Tulsa Law Journal 627 at 632: Fairbanks argues that traditional legal education
concentrates on legal analysis at the expense of practice skills; And see also,
Warren E. Burger; "The Special Skills of Advocacy", (1973-74) 42 Fordham Law
Rev. 227, 243, and see, Warren E. Burger; "Some Further Reflections on the
Problems of Adequacy of Trial Counsel", (1980) 49 Fordham Law Rev. 1-25; In
these articles, Burger argues cogently that competency in trial advocacy is part and
parcel of a total concept of professional responsibility.
19. Herbert Packer and Thomas Ehrlick, New Directions In Legal Education (New
York: McGraw Hill Book Co., 1972). This Report, prepared for the Carnegie
Commission on Higher Education identifies "justice" as the central goal of the
law.
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education ignored these concerns, some educators asked for a
renewed definition of professional responsibility. 20 Succinctly
stated, the most complete definition of professional responsibility
was said to include, 1) high quality services, 2) professional ethics,
and; 3) a perception of the legal system's role in society. 21 For the
purposes of this study, these criteria will serve as a starting point
from which questions will be raised concerning legal education and
professional responsibility. Does legal education, in its present
form, lay the foundation for high quality services? Have the law
schools answered the ethics question? What about the adequacy of
methods used to teach the law and legal morality? Can it be said that
student lawyers will gain insight into the legal system during their
three years at law school? These and other questions will be brought
to the fore, dealt with, and it is hoped answered, in an attempt to
critically evaluate modem legal education and its effect on lawyers
as professionals.
III. The Schools: Past and Present Criticisms
Paralleling the ongoing discussion over professional ethics and
whether indeed it should be taught in the schools is the discussion
concerning legal education itself, its quantity, quality and
usefulness.
Law schools have always maintained a set of primary goals in the
making of a lawyer. Important among these are the imparting of
knowledge and skills and also helping the student to understand the
process he will participate in as a lawyer. In addition, it is felt that
the real objective of the law school is "to teach men to think like
lawyers". 22 Canadian schools have adopted these criteria and have
held these objectives to be major ones in the making of proficient
lawyers. 23 To adequately meet these goals two primary methods
have been used: The case method and the Socratic method.
20. See, for example, Donald T. Weckstein, "Boulder II: Why and How?" in
Donald T. Weckstein (ed) Education In Professional Responsibility of the Lawyer,
which is Appendix B to Stuart C. Goldberg (ed) National Conference on Teaching
Professional Responsibility (1977).
21. W. Wade Berryhill, "Clinical Education - A Golden Dancer", (1978) 13 U.
of Richmond L. Rev. 69 at 76.
22. Lon Fuller, "What the Law School Can Contribute To The Making of A
Lawyer", (1945) 1 J. of Legal Ed. 189 at 190.
23. E. Veitch and R. A. MacDonald, "Law Teachers and Their Jurisdiction",
(1978) 56 Can. Bar Rev. 710 at 719.
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A. Methodology
1. The Case Method
Law schools have used the case method as a means of instruction for
more than a hundred years. With the case method the student is
expected to learn legal rules or principles of law which are set out in
judgments from the various appellate courts around the country.
Along with increasing the students' knowledge of the law, the
method is thought to heighten the students' ability to critically
analyze cases, statutes, and related legal materials. However,
serious criticisms concerning the effectiveness of the method began
to appear in the early twentieth century.
24
Almost fifty years ago Jerome Frank offered suggestions and
criticisms which he thought would greatly improve the quality of
legal education. His chief complaint was that law schools were too
book-oriented and not people-oriented. Frank's recommendations
included the use of clinics and a revision of the case method so that
it would "in truth and in fact become a case system and not a mere
sham case system".25 Frank suggested that the schools' use of
appellate decisions as a means of teaching the law "hopelessly
over-simplified" what actually happens in practice.
2 6
This view is repeated by Jon Richardson who goes a little further
and states that the case method is wasteful of time and energy.
2 7
Richardson brings out the fact that the method of instruction used in
all law schools has not changed significantly since its inception at
Harvard Law School in the mid-nineteenth century. This is so even
though the world in which the lawyer functions has changed
drastically during that time.
Richardson chastises the schools for an unnecessary preference
for rules, a preference which takes precedence over more
meaningful techniques and modes, which if used, could provide
lawyers with guidelines for a more holistic approach to the practice
of law. Richardson feels that though the lawyer must have a good
grasp of legal rules, he must also have an appreciation for the effect
these rules have on people. He warns that the schools' present
insistence on teaching the law in a vacuum serves only to "duck the
24. Jerome Frank, "Why Not A Clinical Lawyer School", (1933) 81 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 907.
25. Ibid., p. 916.
26. Ibid., p. 913.
27. Jon Richardson, "Does Anyone Care For More Hemlock?", (1973) 25 J.
Legal Ed. 427 at 435.
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educational problem" .28 Interestingly, recent studies indicate that
law schools, because of the rule approach, have the effect of
frustrating students' humanistic interests.
29
Although the case method is used almost exclusively in Canadian
and American schools, the dissatisfaction with its utility is
mounting. The Shaffer and Redmount study is indicative of this
growing sense of dissatisfaction. These authors found that the use of
the case method is detrimental to students' overall needs because it
tends to develop analytical skills to the exclusion of other skills
essential to professional competence. 30 The stddy also indicated
that the use of the case method was largely responsible for the
task-oriented approach used by students, practising lawyers, and
professors who were interviewed. 31 It was felt that the insistence of
interviewees upon treating each case as a "thing" was reminiscent
of the method of instruction used in the schools. The failure of the
method prompted the authors to conclude that:
Learning the law is now. . .too primitive an experience. It lacks
mental, moral, emotional and social development and therefore
does not serve the best interests of society or for that matter, the
best interests of the legal profession. It lacks humanistic concern
probably because it lacks the appropriate means and conditions
which would ameliorate and improve the learning experience.
32
Without doubt, the strongest criticism of the case method to
emerge in recent years relates to its narrowness as a pedagogical
device. 33 Although it has been said that the case method is useful in
honing analytical skills and imparting knowledge of the law, it
would appear that its functional utility ceases there. Proponents of
the clinical method are adamant in their claims that the clinical
method is a more realistic vehicle for teaching the refinements of
professional responsibility. 34 The case method, while singularly
narrow in scope, has been negatively compared to the clinical
28. Ibid., p. 446.
29. T. Shaffer and R. Redmount, Lawyers, Law Schools and People, (Colorado
Springs: McGraw-Hill Book Co. 1977), p. 194.
30. Ibid., p. 27.
31. Ibid., p. 26.
32. Ibid., p. 33.
33. Andrew Watson, "The Quest For Professional Competence: Psychological
Aspects of Legal Education", (1968) 37 U. of Cinn. L. Rev. 91 at 117-133.
34. David R. Bamhizer, "Clinical Education At the Crossroads: A Need For
Direction", 1977 Brigham Young L. Rev. 1025 at 1034; and see also David R.
Barnhizer, "The Clinical Method of Legal Education: Its Theory and
Implementation", (1979) 30 J. Legal Ed. 67.
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method because of the wide array of teaching techniques available
to the clinical teacher in his efforts to instill practice skills, notions
of morality, ethics and in general, professional responsibility.3 5 In
addition, concerns have been expressed that the almost total use of
the case method during the three years of legal training may have
harmful effects on law students and their perceptions of the legal
order. One clinical educator phrased his objections this way:
Legal education gives the student a distorted view of the
importance of principles and rules in both law applying and law
making. The letter of the law is in practice rarely singularly
honoured or applicable without reference to essentially non-legal,
but extremely relevant attitudes, actions and perceptions. On a
fundamental level law cannot be predicted and the meandering of
legal process cannot be prophesised without reference to the
human factor. In its operation, the law is not a restatement or
working out of positive rules. The law operates as it does because
it is influenced by a myriad of conflicting variables which must
be understood by the practicing lawyer. Legal education should
equip students to identify these factors so that when they work
with the law, they can manipulate them as effectively as they do
legal principles. This must be a conscious study. 36
Not only has the case method been blamed for "keeping students
in ignorance of the realities of the system" 37 but the method has
also been cited as being inherently indoctrinative. 38 Academics fear
that students may be subjected to three years of value-inculcation
because the moral content in legal education is not overtly
questioned. Indeed, it has been said that the traditional format of
35. David R. Barnhizer, "The Clinical Method of Legal Education: Its Theory and
Implementation", p. 109. Here the author lists a variety of techniques which may
be used by the clinical teacher: 1) Socratic dialogue, 2) Directed discussion, 3) Free
discussion, 4) Lawyering performance by students, 5) immediate individualized
feedback, 6) Simulations and role playing, 7) Observation, 8) Evaluation, 9) Video
and Audio tape, 10) Analysis of cases, 11) Research, 12) Writing, 13) Lecturing
techniques, 14) Problem techniques, 15) Student Presentation, 16) Structure.
36. Neil Gold, "Legal Education, Law and Justice: The Clinical Experience",
(1979) 44 Sask. L. Rev. 97 at 121-122.
37. David Bamhizer, "Clinical Education At the Crossroads: The Need for
Direction", p. 1038.
38. Kenneth E. Gray, "What We Do To Law Students or The Judicial Philosophy
of W. Barton Leach", (1978-79) 17 Duquesne L. Rev. 381 at 397: This writer
advises that the problem in legal education is often that students do not understand
what is happening to them because value judgments are made in a very limited
way. He advises also that case discussion in class is "laced with evaluation" every
time it is discussed.
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legal education is capable of conditioning students to accept certain
values as "intrinsic to the profession".
39
The view that an unquestioning attitude or complacent acceptance
of the prevailing value system does amount to indoctrination has
received support from Lawrence Kohlberg. Kohlberg has suggested
that morality is inseparable from education and any system of
education which denies this fact at best "miseducates" and at worst
"indoctrinates" its students. 40Kohlberg further suggests that any
curriculum whose moral content remains unquestioned supports the
notion that it is valid to have an "unieflective hidden
curriculum".41 It is patent, therefore, that as the question of
morality has never been seriously dealt with in case analysis, an
obvious risk of indoctrination does exist in spite of legal educators'
staunch claims to the contrary. Kohlberg warns that such practices
are not compatible with "conceptions of civil liberties that are
central not only to American democracy but to any just social
system".42
Thus, the arguments surrounding the discussion on the use of the
case method generally regard the extent to which it is used as being
unnecessary in varying degrees, 43 outdated, 44 and even morally
45
and psychologically 46 damaging to the individual lawyer and
ultimately to the society he represents. 47 Some do agree that its use,
though shortened and moderated from its present form, may still
have a place in the law school curriculum.
48
39. David R. Barnhizer, "Clinical Education At the Crossroads: The Need for
Direction", p. 1043. Here, the author points out that it is extremely difficult to
teach value systems and professional behavior when these are at odds with existing
values of the legal profession - the existing values being an "elitist concentration
on the preservation of entrenched property, wealth and power".
40. Lawrence Kohlberg, pp. 1-4.
41. Ibid., p. 7.
42. Ibid., p. 8.
43. L. H. Frankel, "Humanist Law: The Need For Change", (1976) Utah L. Rev.
39 at 40-49.
44. Jon Richardson, P. 434.
45. Lawrence Kohlberg, pp. 1-4.
46. Andrew Watson, "Some Psychological Aspects of Teaching Professional
Responsibility", (1963) 16 J. Legal Ed. I at 12.
47. Andrew Watson, "The Quest For Professional Competence", pp. 117-133.
48. Andrew Watson, "Lawyers and Professionalism, A Further Psychiatric
Perspective on Legal Education", (1975) 8 U. of Mich. L. Rev. 248-285.
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2. The Socratic Method
Causing almost as much consternation and debate as the case
method is the use of the Socratic technique which is employed by
most schools in both Canada and the United States. Through the use
of this method the student is asked thought-provoking questions
which produces an analysis of legal issues. It is believed that this
procedure, used in conjunction with the case method, results in a
sharpening of the students' ability to critically analyze relevant
material. Additionally, it is felt that the use of the method serves to
prepare the student for the adversarial stance which must be adopted
in practice.
The Socratic method of instruction is at least as old as the case
method and has withstood twentieth century change almost as
admirably as the case method itself. This apparent inflexibility
prompted one writer to observe that the Socratic method and legal
doctrine were "not married in Heaven, only at Harvard".
49
The acute distress created within the student by the use of the
Socratic technique is generally well recognized by legal educators.
Disagreement has arisen in relation to the validity of that distress.
One student, for example, referred to the prevailing atmosphere in
the first year class as an "atmosphere of collective terror". 50 It has
been said that this terror is essential because it "breeds precision
and ability and confidence" necessary in the world of the
courtroom. 51 The modem students' desire to learn the law without
undergoing intense discomfort has been characterized by one
leading academic as an element of the "hedonism of modem
life" .52
Along with the prevailing resentment attached to the continued
use of the technique, writers attribute an increasing number of
problems both inside and outside the law school to its use. Some
educators feel that the use of the method in the first year class is an
exercise in intimidation and does not bring about the beneficial
49. Jon Richardson, p. 435.
50. Duncan Kennedy, "How The Law School Fails: A Polemic", (1970) 1 Yale
Review & Social Action; 71 at 75.
51. Kenneth E. Gray, p. 392 .
52. Francis A. Alien, p. 73; and see also James P. Taylor, "Law School Stress and
the Deformation Professionelle", (1976) 27 J. Legal Ed. 251 at 266. This writer
argues that while legal education is indeed stressful, that stressfulness may not be
entirely harmful. The implication is that stressfulness may play a useful role in the
making of proficient lawyers.
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results which might justify its continued use. 53 Indeed, the
somewhat dubious role of the law teacher in the Socratic classroom
has not gone unnoticed by students or faculty. 54 Law students have
been said to exhibit extreme vulnerability in first year, and in some
instances, are at the mercy of their teachers. 55 The very nature of
the Socratic method with its unending questions, few rewards, and
lack of professional sympathy is perceived by the student as an
assault. 56 Thus interpreted, the assault creates a feeling of being in
constant "danger" - a danger that has been characterized as being
"real". 57 Since stressfulness cannot be maintained indefinitely,
students tend to extricate themselves by adopting an "unemotional"
stance. 58 The rewards for the creation of this formation are twofold:
It serves to protect the student from further anxiety and some
approval is forthcoming once the student has embraced the
approved norms of objectivity and rationality. 59 This procedure,
however, bears lamentable consequences for law students. In this
"splitting and polarizing" 60 process, subjectivity, idealism and
hope, attributes which are essential to professionalism remain
buried and are thereafter not easily accessible. 61
While some educators are of the opinion that anxiety is a natural
and even rewarding consequence of the learning experience, 62
others feel that the degree of anxiety in the Socratic classroom
impedes fruitful learning and therefore the method should be
seriously questioned as a good teaching technique. 63 However,
recognition has been given to the damaging qualities of the Socratic
method as it is used in modem law classes and it has been suggested
that the critical problem facing legal education is how to mitigate
53. Shaffer and Redmount, p. 8.
54. See generally Duncan Kennedy, pp. 72-75; and Jon Richardson, pp. 435-444.
55. David R. Barnhizer, "Clinical Education At the Crossroads: The Need For
Change", p. 1036.
56. Duncan Kennedy, p. 73.
57. Andrew Watson, "The Quest For Professional Competence: Psychological
Aspects of Legal Education", p. 122.
58. Ibid., p. 131.
59. Ibid., p. 132.
60. Paul N. Savoy, "Towards A New Politics of Legal Education", (1970) 79
Yale L. J. 444 at 461.
61. Andrew Watson, "The Quest For Professional Competence: Psychological
Aspects of Legal Education", p. 127.
62. Francis A. Allen, pp. 73-74.
63. Andrew Watson, "The Quest For Professional Competence: Psychological
Aspects of Legal Education", p. 123.
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the traditional "syndrome of disengagement" experienced by law
students. 64
Although writers are concerned about the possibility of
psychological damage, others have expressed additional fears about
what they consider to be newer problems associated with the use of
the method. It has been pointed out that the size of the modern day
law class does not easily lend itself to the technique. Classes in
some schools average between sixty and ninety students and are
largely impersonal. In such a setting the Socratic technique becomes
perverted and a situation arises in which the students ask questions
only after the Professor has given a "mind-boggling exposition of
skill and argument". 65 When the method is used in larger classes it
results in imparting knowledge but does nothing to increase the
students' ability to critically analyze. This dilemma prompted one
writer to conclude that the Socratic method is nothing more than an
"obscene myth. . .which is today little more than a memory". 66
The Socratic method, while effective at least to some extent in
increasing students' ability to critically analyze, has been cited as
causing some of the more serious flaws which later appear in the
lawyers' professional character. It is noteworthy that while many in
legal education feel that the Socratic method is still useful, no one
has made the claim that the method, as presently used, overtly
assists lawyers in confronting the larger issue of professional
responsibility. Ironically, it has been suggested that the Socratic
technique has the opposite effect. 6
7
Writers have not been remiss in recognizing that the Socratic
method as used in the modem day law class bears little resemblance
to the original Socratic technique.6 8 For example, Thaler draws a
distinction between the original Socratic technique where students
were taught to clarify values with sensitivity and creativity and the
method presently being used in the schools. 69 It has been suggested
that the Socratic method was first used to promote a concern for the
64. Allan A. Stone; p. 427.
65. Shaffer and Redmount, p. 9.
66. Ibid., p. 18.
67. Ronald M. Pipkin, "Law School Instruction in Professional Responsibility: A
Curricular Paradox", (1979) 2 Am. Bar F.R.J. 247 at 259-275.
68. Jeff Thaler, "What's Left of You After Law School", (1976) 4 Student
Lawyer 12.
69. Ibid., p. 14.
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growth of justice in students - a concern which is linked to the
growth of justice in society.
70
Interestingly, Lawrence Kohlberg, who has cited justice as being
the ultimate form of morality, believes that the Socratic technique is
an appropriate method for encouraging moral development in
students. 71 In a word, Kohlberg's theories hold that ethical
judgment is a function of individual moral growth, 72 that moral
development is characterized by identifiable stages 73 and that moral
development, like cognitive development, is sequential, invariant
and universally applicable. 74 Kohlberg maintains that the Socratic
method, correctly used, could serve to enhance students' moral
growth because:
The way to stimulate stage growth is to pose real and hypothetical
dilemmas to students in such a way as to arouse disagreement and
uncertainty as to what is right. The teachers' primary role is to
present such dilemmas and to ask Socratic questions that arouse
students' reasoning and focus students' listening to one another's
reasons. . .Developmental moral discussion thus arouses
cognitive-moral conflict and exposes students to reasoning by
other students at the next stage above their own.
75
70. Lawrence Kohlberg, p. 37.
71. Ibid., p. 26.
72. This view is in direct contradiction to older views which posited that moral
development ceased after infancy and that moral growth and development were
fixed and therefore not malleable after the infancy stage. See for example, Donald
W. Weckstein, "Watergate and the Law Schools", (1975) 12 San Diego L. Rev.
261.
73. Lawrence Kohlberg, p. 16-19. Theorizing from years of cross-cultural studies,
Kohlberg believes that individuals progress through stages of moral development.
Kohlberg's theories differ from older views which maintain that morality is relative
to the individual's culture. Kohlberg has identified six universal stages of moral
development:
A. The Preconventional stage
Stage 1. Punishment and Obedience Orientation.
Stage 2. Instrumental Relativist Orientation.
B. The Conventional Level
Stage 3. The Interpersonal Concordance or "Good girl-nice boy" orientation.
Stage 4. The Society Maintaining Orientation.
C. Post Conventional, Autonomous or Principled Level
Stage 5. The Social Contract Orientation.
Stage 6. The Universal Ethical Principle Orientation.
74. Ibid., pp. 20-26.
75. Ibid., p. 2 7 .
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Kohlberg is of the opinion that moral education is a drawing out
from within through dialogue 76 and that moral education, far from
being incompatible with educational systems and their objectives
and aims, is an intricate part of educators' commitment to justice
and to the rights of people.
77
The use of the Socratic method as a technique in developing
morality in law students would depart from the current trend in two
important areas. Firstly, the Socratic technique would be used to
increase both moral development and analytical skills. Secondly,
this combination could serve to reunite legal education and morality
thus having a positive impact on the way law is practised by
lawyers. Allowing students to retain their innate sense of justice and
morality may bestow further benefits: It may assist in eradicating
the well-established syndrome of fear, anger, resentment and apathy
that so characterizes much of North American legal education.
B. The Curriculum
Although academics have warned the members of the profession
that the practice of law will undergo drastic changes in the years to
come, little has been done to alter basic curricula. This is so even
though vast amounts of money have been spent on curricular reform
in the past twenty years. 78 In fact, curricula in most schools have for
the most part remained static since the early twentieth century.
Minor changes took place in the late sixties when a shift was made
from an almost exclusively compulsory curriculum to a somewhat
less structured one. During the ensuing ten years students were able
to choose which courses they would take particularly in upper level
years. Additionally, the schools experienced an increased prolifera-
tion of "law and. . ." courses. And even though it poses no serious
threat to traditional legal methodology, clinical law programs
became an accepted part of law school curricula.
With increased complaints from the Bench and Bar79 regarding
the poor professional performance of lawyers, the late seventies and
76. Ibid., p. 30, Kohlberg argues that justice can be taught through dialogue
because we "know it" all along. In that sense, the teaching of justice as morality is
"natural" to the student.
77. Ibid., pp. 35-39.
78. Edward Veitch, "The Vocation of Our Era For Legal Education", (1979) 44
Sask. L. Rev. 19 at 22-23.
79. Mr. Justice R. J. Matas, "Legal Education In the Wake of the Sixties", (1979)
44 Sask. L. Rev. 63 at 68, and see also: Terry J. Wuester, "Cafeteria-Style Legal
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early eighties saw demands for the schools to expand their lists of
compulsory courses. It was felt that such a move was necessary to
improve the quality of professionalism among lawyers. Those
concerned appeared to equate the complaints being waged against
lawyers with newer less structured curricula. This deduction may
have been drawn without careful reference to the meaning of law
and its role in society. The ever-present circularity in the thinking of
some educators caused one academic to conclude that without a
"guiding theory about law, the compulsory/optional debate will
rage on indefinitely at its current superficial level". s° It can be seen
that the total lack of real critical enquiry into the relevance of the
present curriculum is probably one of the most striking features of
modem legal education. 81
Every one seems to agree that in order to become a professionally
responsible lawyer, one must possess a minimal degree of
competence in lawyering skills.8 2 Yet, curricula in most schools do
little or nothing to address the issue of practice skills. These
crucially important skills are left to be learned during the students'
period of articles or in the early years of practice. It is presumed that
intricate skills such as negotiation, counselling, direct and
cross-examination, oral presentation and courtroom etiquette, to
name but a few, are best learned via the "pick it up" approach or by
what has been coined the "sink or swim" 8 3 method.
Education", (1974) 22 Chitty's L. J. 255 at 256. Both authors argued for an
increased number of compulsory courses in both first and upper level years to
combat the lack of professionalism among lawyers.
80. Rod MacDonald, "Legal Education on the Threshold of the 80's: Whatever
Happened To the Great Ideas of the Sixties", (1979) 44 Sask. L. Rev. 39 at 54.
81. Ibid., p. 43.
82. W. Wade Berryhill, p. 79; Berryhill says that it cannot reasonably be
suggested that graduates should possess all the skills necessary for lawyering; and
the question therefore becomes - what are the minimum skills a graduate should
possess?
83. David R. Lowry, "A Plea For Clinical Law'!, (1972) Can. Bar Rev. V.L. 183
at 189; see also Robert A. Fairbanks who, at p. 643, lists the following as being
modem problems associated with articling: 1) The high potential for an uneven
quality of training; 2) The lack of uniform curriculum; 3) Limitations due to the
specialized nature of the practice of supervising lawyers; 4) The foremost concerns
of supervising lawyers is their practice and the generation of legal fees, not
teaching practice aspects of the law; 5) There is little assurance that the supervising
lawyer will be a satisfactory model of professional competency and integrity
worthy of emulation, and; 6) There is a high potential for economic hardship being
placed upon clerks and, concomitantly, potential for creation of a bondage-like
atmosphere: For an opposing view see Kenneth Jarvis, Q.C., "An Alternative
Approach To Legal Education", (1975) 9 L.S.U.C. Gazette 108 at I 11.
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Within the confines of the law schools, a minimum degree of
competence means learning the law and acquiring the ability to
analyze and synthesize cases. Unfortunately, the same phrase holds
different connotations for those in practice. For years, law schools
have held the belief that the true aim of legal education was "the
study of law and the institutions of the law". 84 The somewhat lesser
world of practice was not the concern of the law school.8 5 Students
still graduate from law school without the faintest idea of what is
involved in practising law. As a justification for this dereliction, the
schools have always insisted that students could learn practice skills
under the tutelage of senior lawyers. In the words of one writer:
Practical instruction is still left for the most part, to busy lawyers
many who lack the aptitude for teaching, and none has sufficient
time to prepare his material effectively much less develop
effective teaching techniques. Teaching is a difficult art.
Amateurs occasionally do it well but if consistently high quality
is desired it is necessary to rely chiefly on those who have
undertaken to make a full-time career of education. There is truth
in the epigram 'Those who can do' there is equal truth in the
corollary 'but they can't usually teach' 86
Clearly, a dichotomy exists between what the law schools view as
their role in society and what lawyers have claimed are their
needs. 87 This rift has created a great deal of tension between
practitioners and the schools. The resulting animosity reveals itself
84. Francis A. Allen, "The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction With Legal
Education", (1976) 62 Am. Bar Assoc. J. 447 at 449.
85. Francis A. Allen, "New Anti-Intellectual In American Legal Education", p.
73.
86. R. D. Gibson, "Legal Education Past and Future", (1974) 6 Man. L. J. 21 at
29.
87. See Francis A. Allen, "New Anti-Intellectualism In American Legal
Education": at p. 75 he defines "the preservation and extension of intellectually
based and humanistically motivated legal education" as the greatest challenge
facing American law schools; For practitioners' view of educational needs see:
Francis Kahn Zemans and Victor G. Rosenblum, "Preparation For The Practice of
Law - The Views of the Practising Bar", (1980) 1 Am. Bar 7 R.J. 1. The authors
point out that 65.5% of the lawyers interviewed felt that graduating students had
only a fair or a poor notion of what practice entails. Also, while practitioners gave
law schools credit for legal education as such, they maligned the schools for giving
insufficient attention to areas of great importance such as counselling, negotiating,
effectiveness in oral presentation and general interpersonal skills: see also L.L.
Baird; "A Survey of the Relevance of Legal Training To Law-School Graduates",
(1978) 29 J. Legal Ed. 264: This study involved 1,600 former graduates from the
years 1955, 1965, and 1970 from 6 major law schools. More than 1/3 of the
graduates felt that law school did not prepare them for their particular field of law.
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in charges by the Bar that the schools are simply "ivory-towering"
and are "unsympathetic" to the real needs of lawyers.8 8 The
schools have reacted to these criticisms by alleging that modem law
students are "insecure" and to alleviate that insecurity students
needlessly demand "instantaneous practicality" from the schools. 89
Clinical law programs, in a token-like fashion, are the schools'
response to those demands.
IV. Legal Education: Some Preliminary Conclusions
Legal education advances the notion that lawyers are equipped to
enter the practice arena once they have learned basic legal doctrine
and have mastered the art of legal analysis. Legal education finds no
shame in the slipshod manner in which practice skills are acquired
by young lawyers, nor does it find shame in the way in which law is
taught in the schools. The Socratic method and the case method,
traditionally the most prevalent teaching techniques, have under-
gone heavy criticisms in recent years. A wide array of ills have been
said to result from the pervasive use of these methods. The
restrictive impact in regard to skills training, the irreparable moral
and psychological damage to the student and the inability of these
methods to effectively deal with the ethics question have all been
mentioned as major drawbacks. While some educators feel that
these techniques should be maintained in first year, many are
beginning to question their continued use in upper level years. 90
In addition, the curriculum debate continues to occupy much of
the time and energy of some members of the Bar and some members
of the professoriate. While a harking-back to the pre-sixties
compulsory curriculum is being contemplated, little attention is
being given to more serious questions which might shed light on
some of the problems now being faced by lawyers. The modem law
For example, 47.4% said they worked in the area of trial litigation but 1 in 5 said
they received no school training in this area. More significantly, 15.6% said law
school was either not helpful or played no role in regard to their knowledge of
ethics in practice.
88. David R. Bamhizer, "Clinical Education At the Crossroads: The Need For
Direction", p. 1049.
89. Francis A. Allen, "New Anti-Intellectualism In American Legal Education",
p. 73.
90. See R. D. Gibson, pp. 32-34; Gibson argues that the time spent on the case
method should be reduced and other techniques should be used in its stead. Gibson
claims that the method is "hopelessly insufficient" as a means of transmitting
information and hence its extensive use after first year is very difficult to justify.
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school curriculum, reflective of the corporate economy, makes no
attempt to address the justice issue. 91 And under the thin veil of
objectivity and impartiality, students are encouraged to accept,
without further inquiry, an educational system which not only
supports but promotes society's vested interests. The pursuit of
justice, while widely recognized as a meaningful goal, receives no
attention in the home of its would-be deliverers.
Additionally, broadly defined social issues such as the lawyers'
duty to use his power and skills to assist society or to actively pursue
law reform are not even recognized as valid concerns in legal
education. These omissions have been rationalized amid anxious
claims that the schools must remain morally and socially neutral,
and that in general, academic neutrality is absolutely essential to the
pursuit of truth in higher learning. 92 Most prominent in legal
education, therefore, is the impairment of moral and social
conscience. The curriculum as such, speaks loudly of a definition of
professional responsibility so narrow in scope that it serves only to
undermine the higher aspirations of most students. Paradoxically,
one educator has bemoaned the profession's "loss of confidence"
in traditional legal education.
93
Although dissatisfaction with legal education is prevalent in
academic circles, few have attempted to substantially change the
approach used in either Canadian or American law schools.
94 It
would appear that although everyone is "uncomfortable over lost
opportunities in legal education, almost everyone who has a vote
91. See generally: Jerome E. Carlin, "What the Law Schools Can Do About
Professional Responsibility", (1971-72) 4 Conn. L. Rev. 479, and Ralph M.
Nadar, "The Legal Profession A Time For Self Analysis", (1971) 13 Akron L.
Rev. 1.
92. Joseph E. Olson, "Teaching Justice: But Whose?", (1978) 53 N.Y. U.L.
Rev. 609 at 612. But see Edward J. Bloustein, pp. 402-408. Bloustein argues
convincingly that academic neutrality never was consistent with skills training and
in particular, law school training.
93. Francis A. Allen, "New Anti Intellectualism In American Legal Education",
p. 61.
94. Suggested alternatives to present educational techniques and curricula are
many. Almost all offerings involve the inclusion of some form of clinical or
internship program. See generally: M. I. Sovem; "Training Tomorrow's
Lawyers", (1974) 11 Col. J. L. & Soc. Problems 72; Norval Morris, "Law
Schools and other Reformations", (1980-81) 6 Dal. L. J. 213; Graham Parker;
"Floccinaucini-hilipilification or An Evaluation of Legal Education", (1970) 8
Osgoode H. L. J. 201; and see Kenneth Jarvis, Q.C., "An Alternative Approach
To Legal Education".
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votes that it stay the way it is". 95 Perhaps an explanation for this
irony is that lawyers are basically "sentimental" and share a belief
that legal education, at least fundamentally, cannot be improved
upon. 96 Suffice it to say at the moment that the preceding view is
one which the legal profession can ill-afford given the limited
respect the teaching and practising Bar now command.
V. Legal Ethics And Professional Responsibility
This section deals specifically with the various methods which have
been used in the past to teach the rudiments of legal ethics and
professional responsibility. It should be noted that these methods,
with the exception of the clinical method, appear to support general
format and current methodologies in legal education. It was upon
the validity of the legal educational system, or for that matter the
entire legal order, that programs were devised to deal with the ethics
question.
Initially, law schools did not graciously accept the suggestion that
they were the keepers of their students' ethics. 97 Gradually, as the
problems with lawyers in practice became more acute and the need
became more apparent, legal educators began to insist that the
schools confront their responsibilities to their students. 98 It was
determined that legal ethics can and should be taught in the schools
because:
(1) The already conscientious student will be encouraged by
learning of the concern of others for the lawyers' obligations;
95. Shaffer and Redmount, p. 10.
96. Ibid., pp. 8-18; see also Rod MacDonald, p. 16. Here, the author mentions
that reform in legal education "presupposes a context sympathetic to change".
Change has been long in coming because ". . .few groups are more conservative
than the legally trained", and see also Edward J. Devitt; "Law School Training:
Key To Quality Trial Advocacy", (1979) 65 Am. Bar Assoc. J. 1800. The author
argues here that the Langdellian approach to legal education has created "irrational
prejudices" within the intellectually-oriented law school community. These
irrational prejudices have created barriers against balancing present law school
curricula.
97. Eric Schnapper, "The Myth of Legal Ethics", (1978) 64 A.B.A.J. 202 at 204.
Schnapper, voicing the frustration experienced by many educators and practitioners
with conventional methods used to teach legal ethics stated that: "legal ethics, like
politeness on subways, kindness to children or fidelity in marriage cannot to a great
effect be taught in school".
98. E. Blythe Stason, "Forward" in Leory L. Lamborn: Legal Ethics and
Professional Responsibility: Current Survey of Methods of Instruction In American
Law Schools. (Chicago: The American Bar Foundation, 1961), p. (i).
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(2) The young lawyer will not be apt to violate the canons
through mistake or ignorance of its provisions;
(3) The indifferent student may become convinced of the benefit
to the profession, and consequently to himself, of adherence to
the canons and of the assumption of professional responsibilities,
and;
(4) Even the unethical student will become aware of and possibly
be restrained by the sanctions that can be imposed upon him for
improper conduct. 99
Although some writers made a distinction between legal ethics
and professional responsibility, it was generally agreed that the
schools should be responsible for imbuing the student with a sense
of professionalism. For example, Leroy Lamborn 100 made a marked
distinction between legal ethics and professional responsibility.
According to this writer, legal ethics included the duties of the
practitioner as expressed principally in the canons. Professional
responsibility, on the other hand, was said to be concerned with the
moral obligations of the lawyer. The moral obligations of the lawyer
encompassed such broad areas as law reform, community service
projects and adequate representation for the indigent client. Other
writers put forth even broader definitions of professional responsi-
bility stating it must necessarily include all those things done by
practising lawyers. 1°1 Thus, professional responsibility gradually
took on a meaning which involved not only legal ethics in the
conventional sense, but also an enlarged conception of legal ethics
which included the lawyer's duty to society. 1
02
Because of the renewed interest in professional responsibility, a
series of conferences was held to determine viable ways of bringing
notions of professional responsibility into the law school cur-
riculum. In 1956 a number of eminent scholars and members of
associated professions gathered at Boulder, Colorado to discuss
proposed ways of teaching professional awareness to lawyers. 10 3
Throughout the conference, five major areas of public responsibility
99. Robert E. Matthews; "Forward" in Julius Stone, Legal Education and Public
Responsibility (Washington: Association of American Law Schools, 1959), p. i.
100. Leroy L. Lamborn, p. 2.
101. See, for example, Donald T. Weckstein, "Watergate And The Law
Schools", p. 278.
102. Jack B. Weinstein; "Educating Ethical Lawyers", (1975) N.Y. State B. J.
260 at 309. Weinstein advises that an "expanded sense of ethics" must include the
profession's obligations to society.
103. Julius Stone, p. 363.
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were isolated by its members. 10 4 It was generally agreed that
methods should be made available in the schools to accommodate
instruction with these areas in mind. Other conferences followed the
Boulder one reiterating the themes expressed and adding that newer
and better means of instruction were required. '
0 5
A. Methods Used to Teach Legal Ethics and Professional
Responsibility
Historically, ethics and morality in legal education were taught by a
combination of elucidating for law students positive moral-legal
standards or by extolling the virtues of a good lawyer. 10 6 Both
approaches assumed that morality was referable to the immediate
climate and culture in which the lawyer lived and worked. 10 7 Thus,
the virtues of a good lawyer could be categorized and enumerated in
a fashion which might make them accessible to easy ethical
instruction. Because the lawyers' morality was seen as being
personal in nature, legal educators exhibited a strong disdain for the
necessity of delving into those virtues which formed the basis of
104. Ibid., pp. 6-7; Professor Julius Stone compiled the material discussed at the
conference and listed five major areas of public responsibility: (1) The lawyers'
standard of decency; (2) Standards in pursuit of clients' interests; (3) Standards
vis-a-vis the community generally in advancing his own or his clients' interests; (4)
Standards as a citizen, of affirmative interest in the public domain, and; (5)
Standards for settling conflicts between the duties arising within each of these areas
or between them and those of general moral or religious duty.
105. H. R. Sacks; "Education For Professional Responsibility", (1960) 46
A.B.A.J. 1111, and see Joint Committee on Continuing Legal Education of the
American Law and the Institute of the American Bar Association, Arden House II,
Toward Excellence in Continuing Legal Education: The Report on the Second
National Conference on the Continuing Education of the Bar, December 14-17,
1963; (Philadelphia, 1964); And see also Donald T. Weckstein, "Boulder II: Why
and How?", in Donald T. Weckstein (ed.) Education In Professional
Responsibilities of the Lawyer, which is appendix B to Stuart C. Goldberg (ed.)
1977 National Conference on Teaching Professional Responsibility.
106. C. Paul Rogers III. "An Approach to Teaching Professional Responsibility
To First Year Law Students", (1977) 4 Ohio N.U.L. Rev. 803 at 817. This writer
takes the view that lawyers may perform acts of "questionable" character because
they are ignorant of the ethical restraints which govern their profession. Thus,
sensitizing students to their obligations via the Code of Ethics or by drawing to the
students attention the practical ethical problems faced by lawyers may serve to
instill ethical behaviour.
107. Lawrence Kohlberg, pp. 2, 53; Kohlberg maintains that the problem with
traditional "character education" is that it equates virtue with "conventional or
social consensus morality". The relativist approach assumes that standards of
"cultural correctness' ought to be studied and internalized as the basic moral rules
of the culture.
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choices and decisions made by lawyers. The fear of indoctrination
also became a real concern for those involved in teaching legal
ethics.' 08 Nonetheless, law schools attempted to teach professional
responsibility and legal ethics by a variety of means. The major
vehicles were the course method, the pervasive method and most
recently, the clinical method. Some schools tried the guest lecture
technique, along with video and audio aids (though to a much lesser
degree). 0 9 The course method and the pervasive method,
traditional servers of the task, have occupied much of the time and
energy of those interested in teaching morality and for that reason a
lenghty discussion of each will follow. The clinical method, the
newest and most radical effort, has gained considerable momentum
in recent years. Clinical education will be examined and evaluated
not only as a viable alternative to current ethical methodologies but
also as a constructive addition to the law school curriculum.
1. The Course Method
The course method was developed to familiarize students with the
basic rules contained in the Canons of Ethics. Some schools also
developed courses which included a more expansive treatment of
the Canons. Involved in these courses were notions of the lawyer's
role in society, his duty to society and the lawyer's moral
obligations to society."10
Although the course method has been used for teaching
professional responsibility in one form or another, it has not met
with success and acceptance from the academic community.
Opinions on the course method range from total agreement with its
108. Noyes Leech, "The Law Schools and The Teaching of Professional
Responsibility", (1977-78) 33 Business Lawyer 1521 at 1531.
109. See Lawrence A. Dubin, "Professional Irresponsibility of Lawyers:
Conversations With Victims", from Stuart C. 1977 Goldberg (ed.), 1977 National
Conference on Teaching Professional Responsibility.
110. Leroy L. Lamborn, pp. 2, 4; the author notes that in 1963 seventy-seven
percent of the approved American Law schools were teaching such a course. And
see Stuart C. Goldberg, National Survey on Current Methods of Teaching
Professional Responsibility in American Law Schools, in Stuart C. Goldberg (ed.)
Pre-Conference Materials; National Conference on Teaching Professional
Responsibility vii, xviii (Detroit: University of Detroit Law School, 1977). The
author indicates that by 1977 ninety-six percent of these schools were offering a
course in either legal ethics, professional responsibility or the legal profession.
Thus, an overwhelming majority of schools taught a course in ethics under one
heading or another with slightly varied content.
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usefulness,"' to partial acceptance of the method, 1 2 to outright
denial of the course method as a useful tool in sensitizing students to
ethical problems in practice. "
3
The lack of consensus on the merits of the course method relate
not to questions involving the necessity of ethical instruction but to
the appropriateness of course content and methodology. For
example, H. W. Arthurs, having used the course method in his own
classroom, admits to being a supporter of the method but balks at
the suggestion that the method become mandatory in any form.1 4
His reasons for disagreeing with the avenue now being used by
American Schools 1' 5 are threefold: mandatory courses in ethics
makes the student resentful; the required course also makes the
student apathetic to the overall objectives of the course; and
additionally, it is felt that one cannot "coerce" students into
virtue.l -
Arthurs is not alone in his concern about coercing students into
virtue. Writers who have studied the use of the course method
become agitated when confronted with the possibility of "preaching
instead of teaching"." 7 The confusion concerning the aims of the
course method and the effects upon the students and professors alike
remain as a constant theme in many of the writings on the topic.
Further criticisms of the traditional course method are that it is
singular in its approach "a canon by canon, disciplinary rule by
disciplinary rule catechism". 1 8 The course method was said to
111. Donald T. Weckstein, "Watergate And The Law School", pp. 260-309.
112. See generally C. Paul Rogers, "An Approach To Teaching Professional
Responsibility To First Year Law Students", p. 803, and see Noyes Leech, p.
1530. Both writers agree that the course method may be useful in conjunction with
other teaching methods.
113. See Charles W. Joiner, "Teaching Professional Responsibility", (1978) 64
A.B.A.J. 551. Joiner feels that present methods do not adequately deal with the
ethics question. He therefore advocates team teaching as a reasonable substitute.
114. H. W. Arthurs; The Study of the Legal Profession In the Law Schools",
(1970) 8 Ont. H.L.J. 184at 195.
115. Chesterfield Smith, "President's Page", (1973) 59 A.B.A.J., 1073. Here,
the author indicates that courses in ethics are now required by all approved
American law schools.
116. H. W. Arthurs, pp. 195-196.
117. See generally: Donald T. Weckstein, "Watergate And the Law Schools", p.
641. For a similar view see James F. Bresnahan, "Ethics and the Study and
Practice of Law", (1976) 28 J. Legal Ed. 189.
118. J. A. Strait, "Scenarios and Problems As a Method of Teaching Professional
Responsibility" in Stuart C. Goldberg (ed.), 1977 National Council on Teaching
Professional Responsibility 686.
Teaching Law Ethically: Is It Possible? 497
place a heavy emphasis on the professional independence of the
practitioner and little, if any, on the system in which the lawyer
functions. As a result of the superficial treatment given the problem,
students rarely acquire an accurate understanding of the underpin-
nings of the adversary system. The course method in this context,
produces students who are cynical and quite indifferent to the
demands of their professional role.' 19
Thus far the course method has been used in one manner or
another in most Canadian and American schools. The dashed hopes
of any appreciable success with the method permeate the writings
on the topic. Aronson suggests that a major reason for resistance by
students to the method is that it remains foreign to the law school
curriculum.' 2 0 The very nature of the ethical dilemma defies
traditional law school modes of presentation, lectures and the
Socratic method. 121 Indeed, one writer has concluded that the
course method remains not only impervious to the law school
curriculum but is largely defeated by it.' 22 The salient features of
both the manifest and latent curriculum supports the development of
lawyers who "understand matters of professional responsibility to
be peripheral to their role". ' 2 3 This writer was of the opinion that if
schools are to successfully respond to social and professional
demands for a better, more ethically sensitive training for law
students, ethical rule learning must be accompanied by new and
perhaps radically different pedagogies.' 24 For the schools, the
addition of courses in ethics to the law school curriculum has been a
119. Ibid., pp. 686-687.
120. R. H. Aronson: "Professional Responsibility: Education and Enforcement",
(1976) 51 Wash. L. Rev. 273 at 278.
121. Ibid., pp. 278-279.
122. Ronald M. Pipkin, pp. 247-275.
123. Ibid., p. 265. For purposes of clarification, Pipkin describes the manifest
curriculum as those attributes which identify the core and peripheries of
professional training such as the designation of courses, variation of credit weight,
required courses or electives, and limitations which may be placed on courses
outside the classroom. The latent curriculum is said to include the content of
instruction, cues from faculty, feedback from the job market and requirements for
bar examinations. Some of the findings in this study were that courses in ethics
have low status in the latent curriculum heirarchy. In legal education, analytical
skills were valued most and sensitivity least. Because ethics courses were taught by
the discussion method, students tend to devalue such courses. The author was of
the opinion that to simply change the instructional format to the Socratic method
would not increase the importance of the course to students.
124. Ibid., p. 275.
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relatively painless, inexpensive and nondisruptive means of
addressing the issue of professional responsibility.
The frustrations experienced by legal educators in attempting to
teach ethics and morality by the course method has been voiced in
terms of a fear of preaching to students or indeed, in a fear of
indoctrinating students with professorial values or with the values of
others. The inherent risks in either of these approaches was said to
be apparent. Educators tried to teach code requirements while at the
same time remaining aloof from value inculcation. Thus, teachers
were caught in what appeared to be an unresolvable dilemma.
Teaching students positive legal-moral standards or preaching the
attributes of a good lawyer leave educators grappling with what
Lawrence Kohlberg refers to as the "relativity problem". 125 It has
been pointed out that teaching content and methodology which is
reliant on relativism, that is, the view that moral standards are
relative to and determined by society, must, of necessity, result in
the imposition of personal value standards and biases. 126 Students
have insistently and steadfastly rejected the values imposed on them
by the teachers of the course method because these values are at
odds with existing values in the legal educational system. 127 To
accept one set of values must mean a rejection of a contrary set of
values128 and since lawyers must survive in practice, the spiritual
exhortations of the classroom have fallen on deaf ears.
125. Lawrence Kohlberg, p. 11. Kohlberg says that acceptance of the idea of
relativity means that the teachers should not teach any particular value. Yet, value
inculcation is inherent in legal ethics courses because they attempt to teach the
prevailing standards of the profession which are reflected in the various Codes.
126. Ibid., p. 10. The view that morals are relative to or determined by society
conflicts with Kohlberg's view because Kohlberg theorizes that morality originates
within the individual.
127. Charles Fried, pp. 1073-5. Fried argues that the "lawyer as friend" concept
is tied to the need to maintain one's integrity as a person. Fried further argues that a
lawyer is not "some kind of anointed priest of justice" and the lawyer, as such, has
no special moral responsibilities. Rather, Fried affirms "the moral liberty of the
lawyer to make his life out of what personal scraps and shreds of motivation his
inclination and character suggests: idealism, greed, curiosity, love of luxury, love
of travel, a need for adventure or repose; only so long as they lead him to give wise
and faithful counsel". The lawyer's self-interest, therefore, easily dominates
societal interests.
128. James R. Elkins, "Moral Discourse and Legalism "In Legal Education",
(1982) 31 J. Legal Ed. 11 at 12. Elkins notes that the "values associated with
thinking like a lawyer may be incompatible with an effort to examine the value
dimensions of life in law".
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2. The Pervasive Method
The Boulder Conference of 1956129 officially recognized the
pervasive method as a possible solution to teaching legal ethics and
professional responsibility. However, the system enjoyed only
informal treatment in some schools and interest in the method
necessitated a more cohesive approach. The pervasive method is
said to:
meld responsibility problems throughout the oral presentation
and written materials which deal primarily with substantive legal
and practical problems. In other words, discussion of profes-
sional responsibility is interspersed throughout the oral and
written education designed to improve professional
competence. 130
Thus, it was suggested that the pervasive method might be utilized
in pervading a special course or for that matter, the entire
curriculum. 131 It was hoped that because of its possible breadth, the
pervasive method might be the answer to the problem of teaching
professional responsibility. 132
Originally it was thought that the pervasive method might more
realistically deal with problems lawyers face in practice. Addition-
ally, students who were subjected to the method might benefit from
being instructed by faculty who had shown themselves to be aware
of and concerned with problems of professional responsibility. To
that end, it was urged that students, instructed in such a manner
might be less resistant to learning about ethics. 133
129. Julius Stone, p. 240.
130. Joint Committee, Arden House, pp. 11, 35.
131. T.A. Smedley, "The Pervasive Approach on a Larger Scale", (1962-63) 15
J. Legal Ed. 435.
132. H. R. Sacks, p. 1111. Sacks suggests that the pervasive approach should be
used in hopes that in the context of regular law problems:
1) The significance and the pervasiveness of ethical issues might become more
apparent;
2) The resistance of students to considering ethical issues, on the ground that it
represents an attempt to "teach us to be good" or is an annoying deviation from
the "real work" of a professional school, might be lowered;
3) The fact that instructors in regular courses took time to deal with professional
responsibility issues might demonstrate to students that the faculty as a whole,
and not just the instructor in legal ethics, are vitally concerned about such
matters, and;
4) Students would be exposed to a range of faculty reactions to what are often
very complex problems of professionalism.
133. Student resistance to the ethics question is well documented. It has been
suggested that law students are more comfortable with legal discourse, and that in
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The pervasive method, in this context, was said to offer students
more practical insight into the workings of the legal system. It was
hoped that the method would more adequately prepare students for
situations in which their professional competency would be
involved. 13 4 Consequently, programs were suggested for planned
pervasion of law school courses. A number of case books were
printed which specifically dealt with ethical issues in conjunction
with regular problems relating to substantive law. 135 It was argued
that these programs should begin in first year because:
early identification and emphasis on various aspects of the
responsibility of lawyers to the legal system will serve to
sensitize law students to their obligations and responsibilities as
lawyers throughout their legal careers. 1
36
Educators warned that a lack of a cohesive approach would result in
chaos and ultimately in total failure.1
3 7
Watson took up the cause and vigorously supported the pervasive
method. While he felt that the course method provided little
functional utility, it might serve as a "capstone" to the pervasive
method. 138 Along with supplementing the pervasive method with
courses in ethics, Watson recommended collaborative teaching
wherein students might benefit from interchanges with psychiatric
residents or medical trainees. His view was simply that no
opportunity should be lost to effectively train students to be
professionals in the fullest sense.' 39 Thus, it was urged that the
process be started early, pursued relentlessly and never ignored
during all formal contacts with students. Failure to cultivate a sense
of professionalism was said to "place the graduating student on the
stormy seas of professional life without helm or helmsmen". 1
40
However, not all reactions to the method were favourable.
Indeed, many serious flaws emerged with the use of the method.
The Vanderbilt experiment' 4 ' was one of the first programs created
general, students fear being placed in a situation where their morals are questioned.
See James R. Elkins, p. 29.
134. C. P. Rogers, pp. 803-4.
135. See W. Young, Cases and Materials on the Law of Insurance (Mineola,
N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1971).
136. C. P. Rogers, p. 819.
137. Ibid., p. 804.
138. Andrew Watson, "The Quest For Professional Competence", p. 156.
139. Ibid., p. 163.
140. Ibid., p. 157.
141. T. A. Smedley, p. 43 5 .
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to accommodate the pervasive method. Although early comments
were favourable, serious shortcomings later appeared. At the outset,
faculty cooperation was voluntary and the amount of time each
participating professor devoted to ethical problems was a matter of
personal choice. A professor using the method had the option of
employing the "piecemeal approach" where he might spend a few
moments of his time enlarging upon the ethical aspects of a case, or
a professor could use the "concentrated approach" where he might
deal with ethical problems at the end of each section. Each method
was deemed to possess specific merit. 142 Although faculty
commitment was initially favourable, the burden of dealing with an
extra workload began to emerge as a significant drawback from a
teaching point of view. Professors were reluctant to devote a
substantial amount of their time to the program either in the
classroom or in time spent preparing for their courses. 143
Before these programs had an opportunity to become entrenched
in the curriculum of the various schools, some academics reacted by
urging caution, 144 and others by completely condemning the
technique as a viable alternative to the course method. 145 As early
as 1965 imperfections were being articulated and alternative
suggestions were being offered. 146 The attitude of the individual
professor and his inability to cope with the method were mentioned
as obstacles to the success of the method. In addition, typical case
books did not easily accommodate the method and therefore
produced a certain degree of frustration among teachers. Also,
correction and evaluation became a contentious issue because of the
far reaching scope of the method. 147
In a cogent attack on the use of the pervasive method, James E.
Starrs best enunciated the frustrations experienced by both faculty
142. Ibid., p. 440. The piecemeal approach was seen to be more beneficial in
some instances because it provided close integration of ethical issues with
substantive law materials and the concentrated approach was seen to be useful
because it allowed for full discussion at the end of the class.
143. Ibid., p. 443.
144. S. A. Samad, "The Pervasive Approach To Teaching Professional
Responsibility", (1965) 26 S.L.J. 100 at 105.
145. James E. Starrs, "Crossing a Pedagogical Hellespont Via The Pervasive
System", (1964-65) 17 J. Legal Ed.
146. S. A. Samad, p. 106.
147. James E. Starrs, p. 377. Students, it was said, were "slow to learn matters
for which they would not be held accountable on a final examination".
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and students who attempted to cope with the method. Starrs14s
allowed that:
The pervasive method. . .possesses so many inherent and
operational deficiencies that its implementation must either be
stayed or, if not, it will inevitably die abnoring. In a word, the
pervasive method asks too much of law classes, of law school
faculty and of law students. In terms of unreality, it defies the
nature of the limits of the individual law school course, it dreams
of an unlimited supply of talented and inspired teachers who have
grasped the essentials of professional responsibility and are
dedicated to the task of invigorating their courses with it; and it
enters into the never-never land where students have an
inexhaustible supply of enthusiasm, energy and patience which
waits upon direction to matters of professional responsibility.
Additionally, Starrs was not negligent in observing that the "seeds
of indoctrination were strewn throughout the pervasive system" 
1 49
and lastly, as students were already habituated to the case method,
pervasive teaching was thought, in any event, to be entirely
futile. 1
5 0
The pervasive method, like the course method, was viewed by
students as an issue collateral to the main objectives of legal
education.' 51 It was said that the pervasive method, taught as an
appendage to substantive and procedural law, by its very nature,
inherently adopts a secondary position in the curriculum.
152
Because of the collateral nature of the method, ethical issues were
also seen as being "foreign" or "strange". 153 Although educators
made attempts to elevate ethics to the level of tax law, few were
successful in achieving this goal. Thus, it once again became
apparent that something inherent in the law school curriculum did
not easily adjust to free moral and ethical inquiry.
148. Ibid., p. 370.
149. Ibid., p. 375.
150. Ibid., pp. 378, 380. The author notes that the classroom recitation of cases is
not suitable for teaching professional responsibility. The "casebook is oriented to
the courtroom, not to the comprehensive demands society puts on the
lawyer... casebook emphasis is with facts and problems of professional
responsibility involve values and objectives."
151. James F. Bresnahan, "Ethics and The Study And Practice of Law: The
Problem of Being a Professional In A Fuller Sense", pp. 194-5.
152. James E. Starrs, p. 379.
153. James F. Bresnahan, p. 194.
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B. Review of Ethics Methodologies
Both the course method and the pervasive method were added to
law school curricula in an effort to inspire ethical behaviour among
lawyers. These methods assumed that ethics and morality could be
added to curricula without reference to curricula itself. Legal
education has always discouraged overt moral questions relating to
the law. By refusing to deal openly with moral issues, students were
forced to accept the value consensus that filtered through the
curriculum. 15 4 That consensus indicated to students that the practice
of law did not entail a great concern with the morality of practice. 155
Morality and a search for justice or truth was something with which
the good lawyer need not be concerned. 156 Indeed, it could be said
that the good lawyer was oriented in the opposite direction. The
good lawyer was "hard-headed", analytical, objective, and
rational; the good lawyer was the one who took an "unemotional"
or "no-nonsense" approach to the practice of law. 157 In this rigid
characterological format, no allowances were made for pondering
154. Lawrence Kohlberg, pp. 38-76. Kohlberg says that value neutrality in
education is non-existent. Present educational systems are dedicated to transmitting
the "cultural given". Knowledge is objective, visible and repetitive - "that
which can be pointed to in sense experience... and can be culturally shared and
tested". Kohlberg defines this view as part and parcel of "cultural transmission
ideology". Since the educational system, to a large extent, transmits culturally
defined knowledge, any pretence of neutrality is said to create "the hidden
curricula".
155. F. M. Thomforde, Jr., "Public Opinion and the Legal Profession: A
Necessary Response By the Bar and the Law School", (1973-74) 41 Tenn. Law
Rev. 504 at 529-30. The author says that "Generation after generation of students
graduate from law school without having been required to evaluate critically the
moral factors in decision-making. Even worse, they often graduate believing
erroneously that morality has no place in the working of the legal process."
156. Charles Fried, p. 1071. Fried says that the lawyer, as a limited purpose
friend, is a "friend in regard to the legal system. He is someone who enters into a
personal relation with you - not an abstract relation as under the concept of
justice". Inherent in this argument is the belief that the lawyers' loyalty remains
with his client. If a conflict between that loyalty and loyalty to himself or society
develops, the lawyers' loyalty must remain with the client, not with himself or
society.
157. These phrases are standard phrases used to describe the good lawyer and are
interspersed throughout the literature on legal education. See, for example, Donald
T. Weckstein; "Watergate And the Law Schools": rationality, we are told, is the
"key to the legal process and the lawyers' role therein". See also Andrew Watson,
"The Quest For Professional Competence", p. 380: Watson, in recognizing the
overemphasis placed on analytical skills in the law schools, reminds the reader that
analytical skills are a "necessary and highly desirable capacity in lawyers, but
surely not the only one".
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the outcome of the lawyers' actions as they affect society. Legal
education, in its incessant separation of law and morals, served to
create the "moral impoverishment" of the modem lawyer.
1 58
Traditional approaches to teaching legal ethics relied heavily
upon spelling out for students what the attributes of a good lawyer
were or upon explaining how a good lawyer should perform in given
circumstances. These methods assumed that morality could be
taught in a purely intellectual setting by lecturing on the virtues
which a lawyer should possess. Left out was the question of the
adequacy of those values or of the content of the values themselves.
The most virtuous lawyers were those who came closest to
exhibiting those virtues expressed in the various codes of
professional responsibility. The legal profession, therefore, had its
own "virtue bag". 159
The bag of virtues approach or the preaching of positive moral
values as a means of inculcating morality carries with it several
inherent flaws. Kohlberg maintains that there are no such things as
virtues and even if there were, they couldn't be taught. 160 As well,
the moral educator using these methods will inevitably find himself
in the indoctrination trap. 161 The use of these approaches has
created serious problems for lawyers. For example, a lawyer caught
in a difficult situation could simply switch, change or bend his
158. James R. Elkins, pp. 34-35.
159. Lawrence Kohlberg, pp. 8-9; The bag of virtues approach to moral education
is basically character education consisting of personality traits which are culturally
defined as being positive. Kohlberg maintains that there are two problems with
using this approach: First of all, "everyone has his own bag and secondly, these
virtues cannot be defined, e.g. What is one person's integrity is another's
stubbornness". The legal profession's bag of virtues consisted of character traits
like integrity, honesty, loyalty, and fairness.
160. Ibid., pp. 34-39. Kohlberg points out that psychologists believe there are no
such things as virtues, i.e. people cannot be divided into honest and dishonest
groups. Kohlberg maintains that character traits such as honesty tend to shift with
the demand of the situation at hand. The view that law students cannot be taught
"to be good" virtually permeates the writings on the topic. See generally Eric
Schnapper "The Myth of Legal Ethics", and Jerome Carlin, "What Law Schools
Can Do About Professional Responsibility", and see also: Ralph Slovenko,
-'Teaching Professional Responsibility: A Reply", (1963-64) 16 J. Legal Ed. 327
at 332. Slovenko, reiterating the view that personality traits cannot be taught,
maintains that personality is a matter of superego development subject to formation
only in the earlier years of one's life. Commenting on the shifting nature of
personality traits, Slovenko was of the opinion that "every person at some point
will yield to temptation, depending on the strength of the internal and external
prohibitions and the strength of temptation".
161. Lawrence Kohlberg, p. 10.
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"virtues" whenever the need arose. The defense for a change in
position which might be observable was that the lawyer was acting
in the best interests of the client or the cause. 162 If this defense was
insufficient, the lawyer's total lack of responsibility allowed him to
state that he was acting pursuant to his client's instructions. The
culturally approved norms of the profession permitted the lawyer to
disallow responsibility for his actions. In other words, the client,
not the lawyer, took the blame for slight indiscretions or for
behaviours which are in the "ordinary parlance unethical". 163
The furor created by the Watergate scandal is largely responsible
for the increased interest in legal ethics.' 64 Indeed, Watergate
indicated to both legal educators and practitioners that in spite of
twenty years of concentrated efforts to teach ethics, the end result
has been one of dismal failure. These findings served to open the
door - perhaps just another inch - for a more serious peek at
clinical law programs.
C. The Clinical Method
The clinical method was first suggested as a teaching device by
Jerome Frank as early as 1932.165 Dissatisfied with current law
school methodology, Frank recommended the use of clinics as an
aid to teaching students the law and its relationship to society.
Indeed, he preferred the method and advised that students should be
given the opportunity to see how the law interacts with the many
social factors that make up a case. Frank was probably one of the
first educators to think that the inculcation of good ethical standards
could result from the use of the clinical method. He felt that
professional ethics could be effectively taught only if students,
while learning the canons, have available some first-hand
observations of the ways in which ethical problems arise in the
lawyer's work. 1
66
162. The reader will recall that this defense was offered by Former United States
President Richard Nixon and his top officials following the Watergate Scandal. The
relativity aspect, therefore, always permits an "out".
163. Eric Schnapper, p. 205.
164. See, for example, Donald T. Weckstein, "Watergate and The Law
Schools", p. 261, and see also Andrew Watson, "The Watergate Lawyer
Syndrome: An Educational Deficiency Disease", (1974) 26 J. Legal Ed. 441.
165. Jerome Frank, p. 918.
166. Ibid., p. 922.
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After much discussion as to the feasibility of the clinical method
as an instructional technique, legal educators from a number of
American law schools agreed to participate in a clinical project
sponsored by the Ford Foundation. 167 The participating schools
were awarded grants under the auspices of the Council on Legal
Education For Professional Responsibility. This project met with
limited success and was carried on as a regular part of curricula. '
68
Following the American lead, Canadian law schools instituted "the
clinic" as an optional course available to students in upper level
years.
Although the clinical program has become an accepted part of
law school curricula, it has not gained whole-hearted approval from
the law school community. Acceptance has been long in coming
because clinical legal education has been characterized by goal
confusionl6 9 and a concomitant failure to develop its theoretical
dimensions. 170 More serious criticisms of clinical legal education
are related to the cost involved in the implementation of these
programs.' 71 To be effective, clinical programs require a small
student/teacher ratio, an ample backup staff, and appropriate space
167. H. R. Sacks, p. 1110.
168. The success of these programs is defined as being limited because these
programs involve only a small portion of the student body in most schools. The
effectiveness of these programs is, therefore, severely circumscribed.
169. Raymond L. Spring, "Realism Revisited: Clinical Education and Conflict of
Goals in Legal Education", (1974) 13 Washburn L. J. 427.
170. David L. Barnhizer, "The Clinical Method of Legal Instruction: Its Theory
and Implementation", p. 67, and see also Gorden Gee, Donald Jackson, "Bridging
the Gap: Legal Education and Lawyer Competency", 1977 Brigham Young L.
Rev. 695; 974. Interestingly, these authors conclude that clinical programs have
not been completely accepted because traditional classroom teaching is easier for
the teacher and that the use of the casebook method and traditional classroom
teaching fulfill the needs of faculty rather than the true needs of students.
171. W. Wade Berryhill, p. 95. Berryhill provides an excellent review of the
stated criticisms and objections of the clinical method: 1) It (clinical) is a
duplication of skills learned in the first year of practice; 2) Practice skills used at the
clinic are not the same skills the graduate needs for real practice; 3) One may
develop bad habits as well as good ones; 4) Cynicism may be the actual result rather
than social sensitivity from early exposure to the troubles and woes of clients; 5)
Because of high costs of supervision and administration, this method is financially
unfeasible, and; 6) Due to lack of adequate supervision in most programs, the time
of the student could be better employed in functions back at the law school. It is
interesting to note, however, that the author rejects the first four criticisms as being
unsound because "the argument that students are better off thrust into the sink or
swim method in practice is in direct opposition to an argument for ethics...
Neither is it convincing that duplication of practice is of no value since almost any
other educational school maintains that practice makes perfect".
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and other facilities. 172 These factors weigh heavily on the
administrative arm of the law school.
Supporters of the clinical method have argued that clinical legal
education provides the student with the only real opportunity to
learn both professional ethics and practice skills. In recognition of
their contribution to the complete professional character, clinical
programs attempt to combine these two vitally important areas.
Clinical education has the capacity to broaden traditional education
in a most productive fashion. The schools' refusal to become
involved in a meaningful way in either professional ethics or
practice skills has created in the practitioner an "imperfect legal
education which is never eradicated". 173 By contrast, the injection
of clinical programs into law school curricula is said to:
1) Assist the law student in developing a coherent and
personalized system of professional responsibility;
2) To integrate and synthesize the diverse components of legal
education;
3) To develop in the student the ability to make judgments; and,
4) To aid the student in learning basic technical skills. 174
These goals are achieved by actively setting an educational goal
structure which will support the stated aims of clinical programs.175
1. Teaching Professional Ethics
Clinical educators are gaining increasing support for their stand in
opposing traditional methods which have been used to teach the
ethics of practice. Often severely critical of abstractionism in legal
education, clinical educators would prefer the reality-oriented
forum of the clinic for teaching and encouraging good ethical
behaviour among lawyers.
In the clinical environment, students are given responsibility for
their clients under the direct supervision of a clinical instructor. The
key to the success of the clinical program revolves around the
172. Michael Meltsner, Philip G. Schrag, "Scenes From the Clinic", (1978) 127
U. of Penn. L. Rev. I at 10-25.
173. Robert A. Fairbanks, p. 628. The view that lawyers are incompetent is not
one that is shared by everyone. It has been said that lay complaints about lawyers
relate more to their "too expert" character. See Marvin E. Frankel, "Curing
Lawyers' Incompetence", (1977) 10 Creighton L. Rev. 613.
174. David R. Barnhizer, "The Clinical Method of Legal Instruction: Its Theory
and Implementation", p. 73.
175. Ibid., p. 76.
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responsibility which students take upon themselves. 176 Although
they have access to guidance, final decisions are theirs and they
must cope with the realities of these resolutions. Under this grant of
authority:
Students are called upon to engage in the legal process as active
decision makers. They must work with clients, lawyers,
bureaucrats, colleagues, and professors in a real life context in
which their choices, behaviour and actions must be tested and
tried against real life consequences. . . The tensions that arise out
of the manifold relationship which students experience in clinical
work give rise to true confrontations with questions of role,
process, client needs and wants, and countless other questions
linked to professional responsibility and the validity of legal
institutions. 177
In a sense, students learn through their own errors and the clinical
atmosphere provides a controlled setting for the learning process.
Students are permitted the opportunity to deal with perplexing
situations and dilemmas of the type they will inevitably encounter in
practice prior to admission to the Bar. 178 The value of this process
cannot be overrated.
For years, clinicians have expressed concern about the lack of
emphasis on the justice issue in conventional legal education. The
view that justice should be part and parcel of the educational process
is one of the newer themes which has received recent attention.
Clinical education has been heralded as the most appropriate vehicle
for exposing students to practice situations where they may
encounter what justice is or what justice should be and where they
may view the "tenuous strand that weaves justice in and out of the
legal system". 179
The importance of emphasizing justice not only as the central
goal of the law but also as the central goal in legal education has
taken on new meaning in light of Lawrence Kohlberg's theories of
moral development. Kohlberg maintains that virtue is not relative to
the culture in which the individual exists nor is it a list of easily
176. David R. Bamhizer, "The Clinical Method of Legal Instruction: Its Theory
and Implementation", p. 108.
177. Neil Gold, p. 105.
178. David R. Barnhizer, "Clinical Education at the Crossroads: The Need For
Direction", p. 1037. Bamhizer notes that students just admitted to practice, exhibit
extreme vulnerability in their first years of practice. This vulnerability is thought to
result from insufficient preparation for practice.
179. Neil Gold, p. 109.
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definable character traits or a group of positive spiritual phrases,
rather "virtue is one and it is always the same regardless of climate
or culture - the name of this ideal form is justice". 18 0 Justice as
virtue lies beyond easily malleable character traits such as honesty.
Justice is a universal moral principle, 181 which according to
Kohlberg should be the dominant theme of every educational
system because it forms the basis for an underlying belief in equality
and the universality of human rights.1
8 2
Clinicians have long argued that neither legal ethics nor
professional responsibility of which legal ethics is an important part
can be taught in the purely intellectual setting of the classroom. In
its sterile atmosphere, legal education erroneously taught students
that the law was either amoral or value-free. Students were said to
graduate believing that justice had no place in the legal process. 18 3
Recognition has now been given to the necessity of dealing openly
and directly with the moral factors which are evident in the lawyer's
day to day decision-making. The clinical setting is receptive to the
role-taking process which is thought to be essential to moral
development. 184 As participants in clinical programs, students must
confront, sort out, select and make basic moral judgments as a
natural consequence of their work. 1
85
180. Lawrence Kohlberg, p. 189. Kohlberg further maintains that "not only is the
good one but virtue is knowledge of the good. He who knows good does good, and
the kind of knowledge of the good vhich is virtue is philosophical knowledge or
intuition of the ideal form of the good, not correct opinion or acceptance of
conventional beliefs".
181. Ibid., p. 40. Here, Kohlberg defines justice as a moral principle and states
that a "moral principle is a principle for resolving competing claims: you vs. me,
you vs. a third person. There is only one principled basis for resolving claims:
justice as equality... a moral principle is not only a rule of action but a reason for
action. Justice is called respect for people".
182. Ibid., p. 39. Kohlberg believes that the central moral value of the educational
process is justice. Since teachers are moral educators, they must be concerned with
justice. Thus, moral education is the process of moving students along to the next
stage of development.
183. F. M. Thomforde, Jr., p. 530.
184. Lawrence Kohlberg, p. 147. Kohlberg claims that "I) moral judgment is a
role taking process that 2) has a new logical structure at each stage paralleling
Piagets logical stages; this structure is best formulated as 3) a justice structure that
4) is progressively more comprehensive, differentiated and equilibrated than the
prior structure".
185. Thomas E. Willging, Thomas G. Dunn, "The Moral Development of the
Law Student: Theory and Data on Legal Education", (1981) 31 J. Legal Ed. 306 at
318. In this study the authors made the following observations:
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Clinical education places a heavy emphasis on the social and
emotional growth of the law student. The transactional character of
these programs permit and allow students to develop and mature
emotionally with the view that growth positively affects the
professional aspect of their lives. 18 6 This feature of clinical
education is in direct contrast to traditional teaching methodology.
Of more than passing interest to clinicians will be the connection
which Lawrence Kohlberg has made between his theories of moral
development and theories of ego development. 187 The suggestion is
simply that an overlap exists between the two areas. Historically,
legal education has paid little attention to either the interpersonal
element or the emotional component in legal study. This failing in
traditional legal education has been the subject of much criticism in
recent years. Watson, for example, says that lawyers who have not
had concrete experiences in learning how to cope with their
emotions and conflicts will later suffer the consequences of these
deficiencies.' 88 Among these consequences will be the tendency to
avoid painful ethical dilemmas and because these situations go
unresolved, there will be an inclination to obscure the issue or
simply to ignore it. 189 Clinical education, on the other hand, gives
students the chance to "mobilize these emotional conflicts in order
that they might be experienced, apprehended and then handled". 19
0
Thus, clinical education has the potential to aid students in resolving
friction between their personal feelings and conflicts which arise
"1) Law students typically have the cognitive capacity for development of
principled thinking; 2) Law students are at an age - typically the early 20's - in
which the possibility of further adult moral development energes in conjunction
with adult experiences. 3) Adult moral development demands substantial attention
to emotional role-taking, and social perspectives which in turn require experience
in a) taking responsibility for the welfare of others in society; and, b) making
non-hypothetical irreversible moral choices."
186. Michael Meltsner, Philip G. Schrag, pp. 8-10; These authors, in defining
clinical goals, added interpersonal and group dynamics plus personal development
and self-awareness to typical legal educational goals such as learning legal skills
relating to interviewing, preparing witnesses, preparing and conducting cross-
examination, negotiation and the preparation of legal documents.
187. Lawrence Kohlberg, pp. 92-93. Kohlberg maintains that cognitive and moral
development are a part of a "broader unity called ego development". Kohlberg
asserts that "education for general cognitive development, and perhaps education
for moral development, must be judged by its contribution to a moral general
concept of ego development".
188. Andrew Watson, "Lawyers and Professionalism", pp. 268-269.
189. Ibid., p. 252.
190. Ibid., p. 265.
Teaching Law Ethically: Is It Possible? 511
between those feelings and professional judgment. 19' These
lessons, once learned, serve as a basis for interaction between
laywers and clients and between lawyers and other people with
whom students will one day work.
2. Teaching Practice Skills
Inextricably linked to a total concept of professionalism is the
competence of the lawyer. 192 Proficiency in interpersonal skills
such as negotiating, counselling, and interviewing are a must in the
lawyer's work. And to a slightly lesser degree, advocacy skills such
as the art of direct and cross-examination and the ability to orally
present and argue a case are still considered to be standard tools of
the trade. These skills have never received high priority in the law
schools and consequently skills training has not fallen within the
law schools' self-defined mission. Very often young graduating
lawyers were left to acquire proficiency in these areas at the expense
of initial clientele.' 93 The law schools' "disdain for the practical"
served only to fuel recent criticisms by both the Bench and the Bar.
Indeed, it has been said that the schools' failure to satisfactorily
191. Michael Meltsner, Philip G. Schrag, p. 55. The authors' conception of
clinical education was that it should provide both a support system and a forum
offering students an opportunity to learn from their experiences. A unified
approach to professionalism was evident because the authors believe that by
working in such an environment students learn to function "not only as individuals
playing a professional role, but also as a whole person who happens to be
representing clients".
192. W. H. Hurlburt (ed.), "What Is Competence" in The Legal Profession and
the Quality of Service: Report and Materials of the Conference on the Quality of
Legal Services (Ottawa: Canadian Institute for the Administration of Justice,
1979). Competence was described as the "state of having the ability or qualities
which are requisite or adequate for performing legal services", and incompetence
was defined as the "state of lacking the qualities needed to give effective legal
services". Incompetence, which is not consistent with the ability to act in a
professionally responsible manner, was said to be caused by the following:
1) Lack of knowledge of the law and legal principles;
2) Lack of knowledge of procedures;
3) Lack of special skills, eg. skills of negotiation, and cross-examination;
4) Lack of organizational skills necessary to have an efficiently operating office;
5) Health related causes, eg. mental incompetence, senility or addiction to drugs,
alcohol;
6) Lack of capacity to become competent, and;
7) Lack of motivation to do good work.
193. F. Zemans and V. Rosenblum, p. 27.
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resolve the theory/practice dilemma remains one of the chief
weaknesses of modem legal education. 1
94
While clinicians feel that clinical education should not totally
replace traditional teaching methodology, many argue that clinical
programs are best suited to providing students with a good
background in skills training. 195 Students in turn have said that
skills acquisition is a primary reason for enrolling in clinical
programs. 196 Lastly, practitioners recognizing the importance of
well-rounded legal training have repeatedly supported the inclusion
of some form of skills training in legal education. 1
97
Despite protests from increasing numbers of the Bar, the Bench,
and students, the law schools have not seen fit to formally equip
graduating students with practice skills. This is so even though it
has been pointed out that competence in legal work is directly
related to the orderly meting out of justice. 198 Clinical programs
could do much to eradicate the sloppiness which is evident in
modem practice. These programs give students the opportunity to
prepare cases, interview clients and witnesses, and additionally,
these programs give students an opportunity to experience the Court
process. For example, students are given the responsibility for
trying their own cases under the direct supervision of a clinical
instructor or advisor. In addition to those learning experiences, the
clinical setting is responsive to a host of instructional techniques
which may be useful in providing training in advocacy skills. 199
Clinical education offers new methods and means of enhancing
traditional legal education. It has the inherent capability of dealing
effectively with the ethics question. In addition, clinical education
provides a forum for training in practice skills which are by no
means less essential to professionalism.
194. R. D. Gibson, p. 28.
195. Neil Gold, pp. 105-110. But see David Barnhizer, "The Clinical Method of
Legal Instruction: Its Theory and Implementation", p. 147. Barnhizer feels that
skills training is secondary to the acquisition of professional ethics.
196. Michael Maltsner, Philip Schrag, p. 11. But see Edward Vink, Edward
Veitch, "Curricular Reform In Canada", (1977) 28 J. Legal Ed. 437 at 448. The
authors argue that studies show that students are generally satisfied with the balance
between theory and practice in legal education.
197. F. Zemans, V. Rosenblum, pp. 23-24.
198. Warren Burger, "Some Further Reflections on the Problems of Adequacy of
Trial Counsel", p. 20.
199. Supra, note 35.
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The failure of clinical education to adequately deal with the entire
question of professional responsibility, unlike conventional
methodology used to teach the law and morality, relate not to
inherent functional deficiencies but to its lack of acceptance by the
law schools. Even though these programs were first suggested more
than fifty years ago the "struggle for legitimacy" drags on. 200 Thus
far, clinical programs have been relegated to a small and often
unnoticeable part of the law school curriculum. One may well
wonder how long it will take before recognition will be given to the
glaring inadequacies in both conventional legal educational
techniques and methods used to teach morality to law students. In
spite of these obvious failings, very little has been done to
encourage clinical education as a better and more constructive
means of educating lawyers. The most prominent argument against
clinical education relates to the cost of implementation and
administration of these programs. In view of the increasing
complexity of modem law practice, the fast growing number of
young lawyers and the difficulties created by inadequate educational
techniques, the cost argument appears to hold very little weight as
an excuse for inaction and apathetic acceptance of the status quo.
To lament that the cost is too high does not effectively deal with the
problem nor does it offer an alternative solution: it merely stands in
the way of change. One would hope that such an evasive
rationalization might by now have outlived its popularity.
VI. Conclusion
Upon reviewing the relevant material on legal education one is
confronted with the inescapable fact that all has been tried but
nothing has been accomplished in the field of professional
responsibility. Ironically, interest in legal ethics and professional
responsibility has heightened in recent years, causing much debate
among academics who are concerned with the problem. The
renewed interest in legal ethics has resulted in various attempts to
teach professional responsibility. While each method of instruction
200. Neil Gold, p. 104. Gold points out that clinical teachers are not viewed with
the same degree of respect and acceptance as the typical law teacher. Gold
maintains that clinical teachers are sometimes viewed with suspicion and are often
non-tenured or special term appointments. Gold further suggests that clinical
teachers are "rarely adequately compensated or particularly thanked". This is so
even though there is evidence that clinical teachers, as lawyers, teachers, and office
managers, work much harder than the teacher of the classroom.
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has achieved a modicum of success, little else can be said to have
been gained by their inclusion in the law school curriculum. Even
though educators have sought vainly to remedy the problem of
teaching professional responsibility, public dissatisfaction with
lawyers has mounted and spilled over into almost every conceivable
medium in recent years.
Central to the abject failure experienced by legal educators in
their endeavours is the unquestioned assumption that legal
education, in its present form, produces professionally competent
lawyers: morality is a matter which is peripheral to legal practice
and therefore to legal education, and ethics can be taught simply by
transmitting the stated norms of the profession. Following this
nostrum, educators have approached the problem by attempting to
correct apparent deficiencies in lawyers by familiarizing students
with the Canons of Ethics or by completely inundating students with
ethical problems of the type that might be found in practice.20 1 It is
respectfully submitted that these attempts have failed because they
address the wrong issue.
Present methods which have been used to instill legal ethics have
failed primarily because they gloss over more deep-seated problems
in the educational system. Legal education is itself narrowly
confined and restrictive, and as such, does not easily lend itself to
instruction in professionalism. In the Holmesian tradition, legal
education thought it necessary to separate law from its social and
moral operation. 20 2 Modem legal education reflected this goal and
hence law was taught without reference to its moral, social or
historical roots. Thus, the process of alienation inherent in the
educational system served to lay the groundwork for the production
of the "amoral" lawyer.
Legal education, confined by a definition of morality which
excluded moral notions relating to law and its effect on society,
characteristically restricted the moral ambit of the role of the
lawyer. Because morality for the lawyer was confined to the
lawyer-client relationship, a need did not exist to develop a more
cohesive notion of morality which would include a total concept of
201. James R. Elkins, pp. 18-19. Elkins points out that professional responsibility
courses tend to reflect the Code of Professional Responsibility, concentrating in a
legalistic manner on the "do's" and the "don'ts" of professional conduct as stated
therein.
202. Oliver Wendell Holmes, "The Path of Law", (1898) 10 Harvard Law Rev.
457 at 459.
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the lawyer as a professional. As a result of this very limited
definition of morality, the lawyer's conscience took on an equally
narrow expression in practice. Legal education saw no need to delve
into broad moral areas relating to justice, fairness, law reform and
social conscience. The difficulty with the prevailing view of
morality in legal education is not in its absence, but in its restrictive
nature. As a result, a complete and realistic interpretation of
professional responsibility is practically non-existent in modem
legal education.
In the late nineteenth century Christopher Columbus Langdell
determined that law was a science and that truth must be ferreted out
by objectivity and neutrality. 20 3 It has since been conceded that law
is not an exact science and cannot be taught without reference to the
social milieu in which it operates. 204 Objectivity and academic
neutrality, the justification for the lack of moral reflection in legal
education, have been attacked in recent years because these features
simply do not stand up to critical evaluation. 205 The law schools'
unquestioned acceptance of the scientific method allowed for years
of indoctrination of its students - an indoctrination process that
was in constant conflict with the stated norms of the profession.
Nonetheless, the scientific approach to teaching the law lingers on
in legal education.
The case method and the Socratic method, traditionally the most
widely used techniques, reflect the scientific approach to legal
study. That these instructional techniques have pernicious effects on
lawyers is undeniable. In the name of teaching students how to
"think like lawyers", these methods isolate students from their own
moral and emotional growth. In the process, objectivity is elevated
and subjectivity is minimized; amorality is reinforced and students
are taught to distrust their own innate intuitions of right and wrong.
These consequences create a startling finding in light of Lawrence
Kohlberg's theories of moral development which posit that justice,
as the very essence of morality, resides within us and that
educational systems should be devoted to the process of nurturing
203. Dean Langdell, A Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts, (Boston: Little
Brown and Company 1879), p. vii.
204. Edward J. Bloustein, pp. 402-408.
205. Ibid., p. 401. The author argues that the traditional concept of academic
neutrality is irrelevant to a decision about the teaching of skills and further that the
adoption of a specific "curriculum which includes one or another set of skills
represents a corporate or faculty decision about the needs of a society, a decision
precluded in principle by traditional notions of political and social neutrality".
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moral development. It is trite to state that the Socratic method, now
used chiefly as a demolishing technique, pales in comparison to the
role it could play in legal education.
2 06
Although there is substantial recognition that the case method and
the Socratic method possess many inherent disadvantages for the
law student, these methods are the mainstay in legal education. The
often repeated justification for the continued use of the case method
and the Socratic method is that these methods teach sophisticated
legal analysis. The accepted consensus is that the lawyer must be
adept at critical analysis and that the ability to critically analyse is
the most important skill in the lawyer's repertoire. Ironically, there
is little direct empirical support for this belief.
20 7
Indeed, the plight of lawyers has been seriously aggravated by the
one-dimensional educational system to which they are subjected.
Adequate skills training has never been included in the law schools'
self-defined conception of professional responsibility. Clinical law
programs have the capacity to fulfill the need for skills acquisition
which is not now being met either by the articling experience or by
exposure during the first years of practice. Clinical programs have
the capability of broadening legal education to include technical
skills, which to date, have not been recognized as a necessary
adjunct to legal professionalism.
Additionally, clinical education speaks to the morality of the
lawyer - an issue which has either been inadequately dealt with or
improperly handled in modem legal education. Clinical programs
take students out of the "ivory tower" and makes them accountable
for their actions. The stress in clinical programs is on responsibility
- or as Lawrence Kohlberg would say - on the search for the true
reversibility of one's own judgments. 20 8 The process of evaluating
206. Mark Weisberg, "Looking For Socrates: Reflections on Legal Education",
(1980-81) 6 Queens L.J. 587 at 599. Weisberg suggests that present methodology
in legal education must be broadened to include attention not only to the breadth of
the material but also to variety and depth. He further suggests that improvements in
the use of the Socratic technique need not be confined to clinical courses.
207. Francis K. Zemans, Victor Rozenblum, supra, note 87; and see as well the L.
L. Baird study, supra, note 87. These studies clearly indicate that lawyers believe
other capabilities are far more important in the daily practice of law. Practical skills
such as negotiation and counselling skills, the ability to prepare and argue a case,
and skills related to oral presentation were prominent among the responses
received.
208. Lawrence Kohlberg, p. 211. Kohlberg argues that reversibility is at the core
of moral judgments that are in equilibrium.
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the moral factors in the decision-making process relates initially to
an appreciation of justice and in the long run to a better society.
Justice, in itself, is non-indoctrinative and as a guiding moral
principle has the opportunity in the clinical setting of being the
central goal in modem legal education.20 9 Thus, the emphasis in
legal education may yet in truth and in fact be on the production of
lawyers with a professional character who are more than soulless
purveyors of legalese and who are indeed worthy of moral
approbation.
The disheartening failure experienced by legal educators in the
last thirty years in trying to improve the lot of lawyers has shown
that current approaches being used to teach morality can have little
or no actual effect on the real problem underlying the lack of
professionalism among lawyers. In the past, law schools have tried
to remedy the problem by "tacking on" courses in ethics or by the
use of pervasive techniques. These efforts have failed mostly
because the basis upon which these courses were predicated was in
error and because an inherent conflict existed between these courses
and the inherent values in legal education. On a larger scale,
therefore, these attempts have met with continual failure because
the educational system is not only foreign to the more ethereal
ethical dilemma but more importantly, because it is foreign to any
matter which bespeaks the human condition. Failure, it is
respectfully submitted, will be the dominant theme in legal
education until massive efforts are undertaken to humanize
methodology and content in legal education.
209. Ibid., pp. 28, 176. Here Kohlberg maintains that justice is "content-free" -
that is, it merely prescribes that principles should be impartially applied to all.
Kohlberg says as well that the teaching of justice is non-indoctrinative because it
moves students along through developmental stages "in a natural direction" rather
than moving students to accept the teachers' values or someone else's values. The
teaching of justice, therefore, avoids preaching and didacticism which is linked to
the teachers' authority. The view that the teaching of justice is non-indoctrinative
differs from previously held views which posited that the teaching of justice may
not only be inherently indoctrinative but also socialistic in origin. See generally,
Jerold Auerbach, "What Has Law Teaching To Do With Justice", and see also
Joseph E. Olson, "Teaching Justice: But Whose?", p. 612. Olson questions
Auerbach's request that justice be taught in the law schools. Olson appears to
equate justice with socialism and he indicates that the teaching of socialism is
wrong and he further indicates that the law schools should continue to be devoted to
"neutrality". This position, of course, ignores the inherent bias toward the
corporate elite in modem legal education.
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